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I n 1983 Dr. David Hilfiker le ft a comfortable medical practice in rural Minnesota to work in a ghetto in Washington, D.C. There 
he practiced "poverty medicine," not low-paid medicine-although it was 
surely that, given his two-thirds eut in salary-but medicine devoted to 
patients who lived in desperate poverty. He helped build a housing complex 
in which he and his family lived with people who were drug addicts, men-
tally ill, and who otherwise lacked adequate shelter and medical services. 
The needs of the community he served were overwhelming, and each day 
he confronted frustrations and dangers that few physicians would tolerate. 
Hilfiker is not a saint, yet he testifies that his "decision to enter the inner city 
was born of a cons cio us desire to move into a doser relationship with God." 1 
He also reports finding greater happiness than he had experienced before, 
including moments of joy in the "miracle" of helping a homeless person re-
turn to a "community of hope." 
In studying professional ethics, a familiar response to people like Dr. Hil-
fiker is praise followed by neglect, if not dismissal. The assumption is that per-
sonal ideals like Hilfiker's have little or nothing to do with professional ethics 
perse. They are "private" matters, regardless of how admirable they may be 
or how dramatically they shape careers. Professionalism (as the very term 
connotes in sorne contexts) implies setting aside personal values, feelings, 
and interests in order to meet the responsibilities attached to professional 
roles. Failure to set as ide one's personallife constitutes a lack of professional 
çlistance and creates conflicts of interest. In any case, personal values are 
automatically trumped whenever they conflict with the shared duties in-
cumbent on all members of a profession. Tho se duties alone need to be con-
sidered in studying professional ethics. 
To expand this response further, professional ethics is reducible to duties 
and dilemmas. It consists of (a) identifying the duties that are or should be 
standardized within professional codes of ethics applicable to all members 
of a profession, and (b) grappling with how to apply the du ti es to parti cul 
situations where they conflict or have unclear implications. All prof 
specify duties: to provide competent care, obtain informed consent, main 
confidentiality, be honest, a void conflicts of interest, and ( collectively 
other professionals) provide public access to services. How such duties 
in particular roles and institutional settings is spelled out in each profession' 
code of ethics. In addition, the law specifies further duties for sorne pro 
sions, su ch as duties to participa te in continuing education and pa y __ · -~'""J"j" 
and registration fees. Commitments to meet these duties are important, 
the duties themselves constitute the content of professional ethics. Any ad":' 
ditional personal commitments are, by their very nature, excluded. 
I cali this dominant perspective the consensus paradigm: Professional ethics 
consists entirely of the moral requirements attached to a profession and im~ 
posed on all its members, together with the ethical dilemmas created when 
the requirements conflict or are too vague to provide guidance. In calling 
the dominant perspective, I am not claiming that all professional ethicists 
avow it. It perme a tes the litera ture in professional ethics without being de-
fended or even formulated as a viewpoint. Usually it operates as the unspo-
ken legacy of Immanuel Kant's preoccupation with universal principles, 
well as the emphasis on general rules in most human rights ethics, con tract 
theory (which grounds morality in the rules that ideally rational agents would 
agree upon), and rule-utilitarianianism (the view that right conduct is spec-
ified by a code of conduct that maximizes the social good). 
I argue that the consensus paradigm is igi~lausible and constricting. It 
neglects how personal moral commitments and ideals motiva te, sustain, and 
guide professionals in their work. To be sur~. the paradigm embodies im-
portant truths. There is a vital need for shared standards to restrain greed, 
secure public trust, and limit personal moral ideals wh en they become mis-
guided. In addition, professional standards restrict inappropriate intrusions 
of the personal into public life, as the scandais in Bill Clinton's term as pres-. 
ident glaringly remind us. Nevertheless, the consensus paradigm is incom-
plete. Even questions about the proper demarcation of persona! and public 
life cannat be answered until personal commitments are given their due. 
Shared duties form the backbone of professional ethics, but a backbone is 
not a complete anatomy. 
In exploring persona! commitments, I will often introduce narrative case 
studies such as that of Dr. Hilfiker and also include portrayals of profession-
ais in works of fiction. Case studies are ubiquitous in studying professional 
ethics, but almost invariably they consist of episodic (time-slice) dilemmas 
about how to act when confronted with conflicting obligations. My widened 
perspective encompasses these episodic dilemmas, but also attends to narra-
tives about how personal commitments emerge, unfold, change, and are put 
at risk. A diachronie perspective reveals the importance of caring relation-
ships, meaningful work, voluntary service, burnop.t, self-betrayal, balancing 
family with other commitments, and other tapies examined in this book. 
started with a religious case study, I should emphasize that I have 
· d on behalf of any particular religion or religion in general. 2 
ax: to grm . . . 
is on moral commitments in carmg about persans, sacral practlces, 
ii\1-t:flil'nizanon~. communities, and the environment. Nevertheless, it is obvi-
h ny individuals do closely unite their moral commitments with 0115 t at ma . . . 
convictions. They also link the1r moral commitments to Ideals of 
r~'''~I,JI.A-" intellectual achievement, technical merit, and physical excellence. 
wf.:m;c;u not share these linkages in arder to appreciate their contributions 
to professionalism. . . 
B cause most personal commitments explored here mvolve comm1tments 
'de ls I will sometimes use the terms "ideals," "values," and "commit-
ta 1 ea • . . . . 
ments" as stylistic variants. The word Ideals may g1ve pause, conJunng up 
, · of unrealistic perfection, self-righteousness, and dangerous over-Images . . . . . 
reaching. I abjure these images, and I will cnt1que the d1stortwns that gen-
erate them. Ideals are commitments to (perceived) forms of goodness around 
which individu al character is formed and which are not reducible to general 
duties. The ideals I explore are eminently practical. Rather than depicting 
visionary vistas, they enter into what Bernard Williams calls an individual's 
nexus of "ground projects" that provide meaning-giving guides and goads 
throughout long and frequently arduous careers. 3 A sin cere commitment 
to an ideal of justice, alleviating suffering, or promoting learning implies 
both high aspiration and practical engagement within a set of given con-
straints. Not only are such ideals achievable in significant degrees, at least 
with any luck, but the element of high aspiration often motivates greater 
practical achievement than would otherwise be possible.4 
An array of commitments to varied moral goods is desirable in the pro-
fessions, even though one persan could pursue only sorne of these in a life-
time. Given limited time, energy, and interest, professionals tend to focus their 
endeavors on a few specifie ideals of goodness, typically th ose to which they 
can contribute creatively. The resulting plurality of goods morally enriches 
professions and professionals alike. Mu ch the same is true of the virtues that 
correspond to the goods pursued, for example, the virtue of justice that cor-
responds to justice as a social good, and the virtue of compassion in allevi-
ating suffering. The varied forms of goods and virtues are not reducible to 
shared princip les of duty, even though they be ar on how professionals un-
derstand their responsibilities. 
Calling ideals personal means that they shape the work of individuals 
without necessarily being incumbent on all members of a profession. It does 
not mean that the ideals are idiosyncratic or eccentric. Indeed, sorne of the 
most important ideals are widely shared among members of religious and 
moral communities, as in the case of Dr. Hilfiker. Moreover, justified per-
sona! ideals typically instantiate general ideals of professionalism, for ex-
ample, what John Kultgen says is the ideal of being "dedicated to providing 
proficient service to tho se who need it,"" and wh at Albert Flores sa ys is "a 
commitment to the ideal of excellence in the exercise of professional skills 
and talents as the best way of achieving the ends of a profession. "6 In 
tion, justified persona! ideals usually instantiate ideals attached to 
lar professions and the type of service each offers, for example nrr~,.,..,.~•-L 
health (medicine and allied health fields), serving justice (law), or 
efficient and safe technological goods (engineering). Far from being 
neous to wider professional ideals, justified personal ideals unfold and 
liven them. 
However, Kultgen's and Flores's talk of "the" ideal of professionalism 
of professions can be misleading. With sufficient abstraction, ail 
sional commitments collapse into a few: to serve clients, promote the 
lie good, and advance excellence. Such generic descriptions illuminate 
shared elements in professional ethics, but they eclipse the enormous 
~ty of ideals that shape individuallives and careers. Thus, describing 
Ideal of medicine as the promotion of health conceals the significant 
ences among health care professionals in understanding exactly what h 
is, how it should be pursued, and why it is valuable. This is especially true 
"health" is understood broadly as the physical and mental capacities 
to function effectively in one's environment. "Effective functioning" .;;,., . ,..,: __ ~ 
moral and social values about desirable forms of behavior and interperson 
relationships. Differences in understanding these values arise at the 
of both individuals and subgroups within medicine such as Catholic 
cians, Christian Scientists, and an array of holistic medicine practi 
The detailed differences influence how medicine is practiced. 
The expression "professional ethics" three things, each of 
I in tend in rethinking professional ethics. First, "professional ethics" mi 
refer to de facto morality, that is, a professio~'s status quo on moral issues 
both its professed standards and actual practices. More full y, de facto moral~ 
ity refers to (a) a profession 's officially endorsed moral standards as stated 
its code of ethics and elaborated in related documents, as well as !"'~ ..... """"'",.~ 
symbolically in awards and speeches on official occasions; (b) the 
held by most members of a profession about moral issues in their profession, 
~nd. ( c) the patterns of morally relevant conduct manifested by most pro-
fesswnals. In connection with de facto professional ethics, I draw attentitJn• 
to the actual influence of personal ideals in guiding and motivating a 
many professionals and professional organizations. The rest of what r 
to say would be of little interest without the presence of large numbers 
professionals who express moral commitments in their worlc 
Second, "professional ethics" might mean justified morality in the profes-
sions, that is, the moral values desirable for professionals. The cons 
paradigm restricts these values to the mandatory shared duties inc:urr1bent 
on all members of a profession. In a conventional version of the paradigm, 
the values are equated with the content of current codes of ethics and re..; 
lated documents. In a critical version of the paradigm, the values are equated 
with ideal codes of ethics, the on es that ought tq be officially endorsed and 
promulgated as uniform standards within professions. Regarding the criti.., 
version, I urge that many personal ideals are justified because they con-
the well-being of clients and the general public. For the most part, 1 
interested in personal ideals that meet minimum standards of decency, 
the voluntary consent of clients, and in sorne way are morally jus ti-
l seek to explore the interplay between admirable personal ideals and 
those justified uniform standards emphasized in the consensus paradigm. 
Third. "professional ethics" might refer to moral inquiry into the profes-
especially scholarly activities and their resulting bodies of knowledge. 
Moral inquiries can be divided into two categories. "Descriptive ethics" studies 
de facto professional ethics. It describes and explains the actual beliefs and 
conduct of professionals. As conducted by psychologists and social scien-
tists, typically it strives to be value neutral, although sorne humanistically 
mtnded scientists conduct their studies within a normative (value-laden) 
framework. "Normative ethics" evaluates beliefs, conduct, and ideals. It is 
an inquiry into justified professional morality. As conducted by philosophers, 
religious thinkers, practitioners, and others, it is a value-laden attempt to 
clarify, organize, and discover the foundations of the values desirable in the 
professions. This book is a work in normative ethics. Although I touch on 
theoretical issues about the foundations of professional ethics, I emphasize 
applied normative ethics: the study of moral issues having practical import 
in understanding responsible professionalism. My main thesis is that nor-
mative inquiries should include the roles of personal moral ideals. 
Acknowledging an important role for personal ideals in the professions 
is dangerous. It could easily be misunderstood by fana tics who pursue ideals 
without good judgment, in disregard of the legitimate limits established by 
shared professional duties and legitimate organizational authority. I at-
tempt to avoid misunderstandings by proceeding with caution, sensitivity 
to context, and ample caveats that block facile generalizations. In addition, 
such an approach avoids sentimental boosterism while enabling us to ap-
preciate professional ethics as a source of meaning in work, rather than 
merely a set of onerous requirements. 
